## ALGORITHMIC RANDOMNESS, PHYSICAL ENTROPY, MEASUREMENTS, AND THE DEMON OF CHOICE

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## ABSTRACT

Measurements — interactions which establish correlations between a system and a recording device — can be made thermodynamically reversible. One might be concerned that such reversibility will make the second law of thermodynamics vulnerable to the designs of the demon of choice, a selective version of Maxwell's demon. The strategy of the demon of choice is to take advantage of rare fluctuations to extract useful work, and to reversibly undo measurements which do not lead to such a favorable but unlikely outcomes. I show that this threat does not arise as the demon of choice cannot operate without recording (explicitly or implicitly) whether its measurement was a success (or a failure). Thermodynamic cost associated with such a record cannot be, on the average, made smaller than the gain of useful work derived from the fluctuations.

When I was asked to write for a volume dedicated to Richard Feynman, I decided that I should select the subject in which I was influenced by him the most, and which would still be consistent with the overall theme of computation and physics. And these influences started well before I met him in person: I got Feynman's "Lectures on Physics" more than a quarter century ago, in Polish translation, from my father. As a finishing high school student I was accompanying him on a hunting expedition in the lake district of Poland — a remote corner of the country. Every few days we drove for supplies to the provincial capital, and there I noticed the volumes in the local bookstore. My father asked why (the expense was considerable), but surprisingly easily gave way to my arguments. I spent much of the rest of the hunting vacation (a couple of weeks altogether) getting through volume I.

Over the years I have developed a habit of treating the "Lectures" sort of like a collection of poems. I like some "poems" more than others, and I return to the favorites now and again. And when I am stuck with a physics problem, reading a few of the relevant "poems" is often the best way to get "unstuck". But there are a few chapters which have been read over and over again without any such an ulterior motive, for sheer pleasure. Amongst them, I would certainly include the discussion of the fluctuations and the second law (the famous "ratchet and pawl" argument<sup>1</sup>).

Thermodynamic concerns and arguments have often pre-saged the deepest developments in physics. I suspect this is because thermodynamics "knows" about the physical relevance of information, and hence, it knew about the Planck constant, stimulated emission, black hole entropy, and so on. When I met Feynman in person for the first time (at a small workshop organised near Austin, Texas, by John Archibald Wheeler in the Spring of 1981), I remember — amongst other things — a thermodynamic argument he used to great effect to prove that one cannot accelerate elementary particles by shaking them together with a bunch of heavier objects, so that they could acquire equipartition kinetic energies (and therefore, because of their small mass, enormous momenta). This idea (credible at first sight, as it is akin to the Fermi acceleration of cosmic rays) was brought up by one of the participants. It would not work — Feynman argued — because all sorts of other modes of the vacuum would have to get their fair share of energy, creating an equilibrium heat bath, with approximate equipartition between all the modes (rather then with the energy in the elementary particles one really wanted to accelerate in the first place).

But that was not the most vivid memory of that first encounter with the man whose "Lectures" I had acquired a decade or so earlier. Rather, I remember best that he showed up at the first lecture unshaved and uncombed, with dry grass in his hair. It turned out that he spent the night outside — apparently, he decided the accommodations for the speakers (which were in the posh tennis club) were too opulent, returned the key to his apartment at the reception, and decided to "camp out". During the morning coffee he has

also reported in detail (and with great gusto) how he had trouble breaking the code to get into his briefcase (where he had the sweater — it got cold). He knew the code, of course, by heart, but it was middle of the night, so he somehow had to dial it in complete darkness. He clearly relished the challenge. I do not remember how did he solve the problem, but the flavor of the adventure and of his report was very much in the spirit of the "adventures of a curious character". And all of this was a few months after his (first) cancer operation.

I came to talk to Feynman regularly, more or less once a month, during my Tolman Fellowship at Caltech (which started in the Fall of 1981), and a bit less often for a few years afterwards. I have also sat occasionally in the class on physics and computation he taught with John Hopfield. And I remember discussing with him (among other subjects) the connection between physics, information and computation. In fact, this was a recurring theme. For me, it became somewhat of an obsession early on — I really liked the universality of Turing machines, the halting problem, and the algorithmic view of information. While I was in Austin the fascination with these ideas and their possible relevance for physics was reinforced under the influence of John Wheeler. Which brings me, at long last, to the algorithmic information content, measurements, and various thermodynamic demons which probe the utility of acquired information.

Maxwell's demon — a hypothetical intelligent entity capable of performing measurements on a thermodynamic system and using their outcomes to extract useful work — was considered a threat to the validity of the second law of thermodynamics for over a century.<sup>2,3</sup> Feynman was fascinated with the subject, and his discussion of ratchet and pawl¹ banished forever the "unintelligent" trapdoor version of the demon by clarifying and updating the influential argument put forward by Smoluchowski⁴ much earlier, and in a rather different setting.\* However, Smoluchowski's trapdoor carries out no (explicit) measurements. Therefore, trapdoors and ratchets and pawls can be analysed without reference to information.<sup>1,4</sup>

The complete Maxwell's demon should be able to measure, and it (...?; he? she?!) should be of course intelligent. Smoluchowski's trapdoor does not fit this bill. Measurements were incorporated into the discussion by Szilard<sup>6</sup>, Landauer<sup>7</sup>, and Bennett<sup>8</sup> who have argued, in a setting involving ensembles of demons, that the acquisition of infor-

<sup>\*</sup> Smoluchowski's original trapdoor was a hole surrounded by hairs combed so that they all come out on the same side of the partition between the two chambers (rather than a real trap door). Naively, this arrangement of hairs should favor molecules passing in the direction in which the hair is combed, and impede the reverse motion. Smoluchowski pointed out that thermal fluctuations will "ruffle the hair" and make this arrangement ineffective as a rectifier of fluctuations when the whole system is at the same fixed temperature. Numerical simulations of trapdoors confirm these conclusions<sup>5</sup>. They also show why our intuition based on far-from-equilibrium behavior of trapdoors can be easily misled.

mation is only possible when the demon's memory is repeatedly erased, to prepare it for the new data. The *cost of erasure* eventually offsets whatever thermodynamic advantages of the demon's information gain might offer. This point (which has come to be known as "Landauer's principle") is now widely recognised as a key ingredient of thermodynamic demonology. This originally classical reasoning has been since extended to quantum physics<sup>9,10</sup>, and may even be experimentally testable.<sup>11</sup>

However, the widespread fascination with Maxwell's demon is ultimately due to its intelligence. A demon will record a specific outcome of the measurement, and — using its intelligence — will try to make an optimal decision about the best possible action, which would maximize the work extracted from a given recorded phase space configuration. This is very much the course of action we take (although, fortunately for us, in a far-from-equilibrium setting). How can one convince an intelligent demon that, all cleverness notwithstanding, its attempts at defeating the second law are doomed? This is hard to accomplish at the level of ensembles: Each demon knows nothing but its own record, and need not care about the other members of "its ensemble" that have found out something else in their measurements — it will find out solution to its own problem.

The ultimate analysis of Maxwell's demon must involve a definition of intelligence, a characteristic which has been all too consistently banished from discussions of demons carried out by physicists. On the other hand, intelligence has been — since Turing and his famous test — often invoked in the discussions of computer scientists. To convince ourselves (and the intelligent demon) of the limits imposed by the second law we shall, following Ref. 12, adopt an operational definition of intelligence which arose in the context of the theory of computation. It is based on the so-called Church–Turing thesis <sup>13</sup> — which in effect formalizes Turing's expectations about the "mental" capabilities of computers and states that intelligence is equivalent to the same kind of information processing that is in principle implementable on a universal computer.

Using the Church–Turing thesis as a point of departure, the present author has demonstrated that even this intelligent threat to the second law can be eliminated — the original "smart" Maxwell's demon can be exorcized. This is easiest to establish when one recognizes that the net ability of demons to extract useful work from systems depends on the sum of measures of two distinct aspects of disorder:<sup>12</sup>

(i) The usual *statistical entropy* given by:

$$H(\rho) = -Tr\rho \lg \rho \tag{1}$$

where  $\rho$  is the density matrix of the system, determines the ignorance of the observer.

(ii) The algorithmic information content: $^{14-20}$ 

$$K(\rho) = |p_{\rho}^*| \tag{2}$$

is given by the size ("|...|"), in bits, of the shortest algorithm ( $p^*$ ) which, for an "operating system" of a given Maxwell's demon, can reproduce the detailed description ( $\rho$ ) of the state of the system.  $K(\rho)$  quantifies the cost of storing of the acquired information, which is related to the randomness inherent in the state of the system revealed by the measurement.

The Church–Turing thesis enters in this second algorithmic ingredient, as it involves an assumption that the intellectual abilities of Maxwell's demons can be regarded as equivalent to those of a universal Turing machine: It is assumed that demons can execute programs (such as  $p_{\rho}^{*}$ ) to reconstruct records of past measurements out of their optimally compressed versions, or to carry out other logical operations in optimizing performance. Algorithmic information content provides a well-defined measure of the storage space required to register the known characteristics of the system.

 $Physical\ entropy^{12}$  is the sum of the statistical entropy and of the algorithmic information content:

$$\mathcal{Z}(\rho) = H(\rho) + K(\rho) \tag{3}$$

Above, it is assumed that the base for the logarithm in Eq. (1) is the same as the size of the alphabet used by the computer which constitutes the operating system of the Maxwell's demon. In practice, it is customary and convenient to employ a binary alphabet, so that both  $H(\rho)$  and  $K(\rho)$  are measured in bits.

In order to appreciate the physical significance of the algorithmic randomness contribution, it is useful to discuss the behavior of H, K and  $\mathcal{Z}$  in the course of measurements and to follow the operations of the engines controlled by demons. In short, the two measures turn out to be complementary — not in the quantum sense, but a bit like kinetic and potential energy — and their sum is, on the average, conserved under optimal measurements carried out on an equilibrium ensemble. Analysis which leads to this conclusion was carried out by this author<sup>12,10</sup> and extended by Caves<sup>21</sup>. Below we offer only a brief summary of the salient points.

In the course of ideal measurement on an equilibrium ensemble the decrease of ignorance is, on the average, compensated for by the increase of the size of the minimal  $record:^{12}$ 

$$\Delta H \simeq -\langle \Delta K \rangle. \tag{4}$$

Consequently, physical entropy  $\mathcal{Z}$  plays a role analogous to a constant of motion. The transformation of the state of the system is now, however, brought about by a *demonical* (rather than *dynamical*) evolution, by the act of acquisition of information. This "conservation law" can be demonstrated within the context of the algorithmic theory of information. 12,10,21,22 However, its validity can be traced to coding theory: 12,21-23 According to the noiseless coding theorem of Shannon, 23 the minimal size  $\mathcal{L}$  of the message required to encode information which corresponds to a decrease of entropy by  $\Delta H$  is, on

the average over all of the messages, bounded by:

$$\Delta H \leq \mathcal{L} \leq \Delta H + 1$$

This inequality is used in the proof of Eq. (4) and is ultimately responsible for the constancy of the physical entropy  $\mathcal{Z}$  in the course of the measurement.<sup>12,21</sup>

The role of  $\mathcal{Z}$  in determining the efficiency of demon-operated engines is the ultimate reason for regarding  $\mathcal{Z}$  as physical entropy. For, the total amount of work which can be extracted from a physical system in contact with a heat reservoir of temperature T in the course of a cycle which involves a measurement  $(\rho \to \rho_i)$  and isothermal expansion  $(\rho_i \to \rho)$  can be made as large as, but no larger than:

$$\Delta W = k_B T(\mathcal{Z}(\rho) - \mathcal{Z}(\rho_i)) \tag{5}$$

To justify this last assertion, I shall appeal to Landauer's principle<sup>7</sup> which formalizes earlier remarks of Szilard<sup>6</sup> and states that erasure of one bit of information from the memory carries a thermodynamic price of  $k_BT$ . Although Landauer's principle assigns a definite price to the storage of information, this price need not be paid right away: a demon with a large unused memory can continue to carry out measurements as long as it has room to store information. However, such a demon poses no threat to the second law: its operation is not truly cyclic. In effect, it operates by employing its initially empty memory as a low temperature (zero entropy) heat sink.

Erasure of the results of used up measurements carries a price tag of

$$\Delta W^{-} = T < (K(\rho_i) - K(\rho) > , \tag{6a}$$

which must be subtracted from the gain of useful work

$$\Delta W^{+} = T(H(\rho) - H(\rho_i)) , \qquad (6b)$$

to obtain the net work extracted by the demon. This immediately justifies Eq. (5). The hybrid  $\mathcal{Z}$  is the physical entropy which provides the demon with an individual, personal measure of the potential for thermodynamic gains due to the information in its possession. It also demonstrates that a demon operating on a system in thermodynamic equilibrium will never be able to threaten the second law, for the ensemble average of  $\mathcal{Z}$  is at best conserved, so that  $\langle \Delta \mathcal{Z} \rangle \leq 0$  in course of the process of acquisition of information.

This last assertion is, however, justified only if the demon is forced to complete each measurement-initiated cycle. One can, by contrast, imagine a demon of choice, an intelligent and selective version of Maxwell's demon, who carries out to completion only those cycles for which the initial state of the system is sufficiently nonrandom (concisely describable, or algorithmically simple) to allow for a brief compressed record (small  $K(\rho)$ ). This

strategy appears to allow the demon to extract a sizeable work  $(\Delta W^+)$  at a small expense  $(\Delta W^-)$ . Moreover, if the measurements can be reversibly undone, then the ones with disappointing outcomes could be reversed at no cost. Such demons would still thereaten the second law, even if the threat is somewhat more subtle than in the case of Smoluchowski's trapdoor.

Caves<sup>22</sup> has considered and partially exorcised such a demon of choice by demonstrating that in any case the net gain of work cannot exceed  $k_BT$  per measurement. Thus, the demons would be, at best, limited to exploiting thermal fluctuations. Moreover, in a comment<sup>24</sup> on Ref. 22 it was noted that taking advantage of such fluctuations is not really possible. Here I shall demonstrate that the only decision making process free of inconsistencies necessarily leaves in the observer's (demon's) memory a "residue" which requires eventual erasure. The least cost of erasure of this residue is just enough to restore the validity of the second law. The aim of this paper is to make this argument (first put forward by this author at the meeting of the Complexity, Entropy, and the Physics of Computation network of the Santa Fe Institute in April of 1990) more carefully and more precisely.

To focus on a specific example consider a Gabor's  $engine^{25}$  illustrated in Fig. 1. There, the unlikely but profitable fluctuation occurs whenever the gas molecule is found in the small compartment of the engine. The amount of extractable work is:

$$\Delta W_p^+ = k_B T \lg(L/\ell) \tag{7}$$

The expense (measured by the used up memory) is only:

$$\Delta W^- = k_B T,\tag{8}$$

so that the net gain of work per each successful cycle is:

$$\Delta W_p = k_B T \left( \lg(L/\ell) - 1 \right) \tag{9}$$

The more likely "uneconomical" cycles would allow a gain of work:

$$\Delta W_u^+ = k_B T \lg L/(L - \ell) , \qquad (10)$$

so that the cost of memory erasure (still given by Eq. (8)) outweighs the profit, leaving the net gain of work:

$$\Delta W_u = -k_B T(1 - \lg L/(L - \ell)). \tag{11}$$

When each measurement is followed by the extraction and erasure routine, the averaged net work gain per cycle is negative (i.e., it becomes a loss):

$$\langle \Delta W \rangle = \frac{\ell}{L} \Delta W_p + \frac{L - \ell}{L} \Delta W_u = -k_B T \left[ 1 + \left( \frac{\ell}{L} \lg \frac{\ell}{L} + \frac{L - \ell}{L} \lg \frac{L - \ell}{L} \right) \right]$$
 (12)

The break even point occurs for the case of Szilard's engine<sup>6</sup>, where the partition divides the container in half. In the opposite limit,  $\ell/L << 1$ , almost every measurement leads to an unsuccessful case which results in a negligible amount of extracted work but undiminished cost of erasure per cycle.

The design of the demon of choice attempts to capitalize on precisely this otherwise unprofitable limit by *undoing* all of the likely (and unprofitable) measurements at no thermodynamic cost, thus avoiding the necessity for erasure of the unused outcomes. It is important to emphasize that a measurement of the thermodynamic quantities can be indeed undone at no cost: A prejudice that measurement must be thermodynamically expensive goes back at least to the ambiguities in the original paper of Szilard<sup>6</sup> (who has hinted at, but failed to clearly identify erasure as the only thermodynamically expensive part of the measuring process), and was further reinforced by the popular (but incorrect) discussion of Brillouin.<sup>26</sup> Figure 2 demonstrates how to carry out a measurement on a particle in the Gabor's engine (such measurement becomes reversible when the operations indicated are carried out infinitezimally slowly).

The purpose of the measurement is to establish a correlation between the state of the system and the record — the state of the few relevant bits of memory. In the context of this paper we shall focus on the measurements which correlate memory with a cell in the phase space or a subspace of the Hilbert space of the system (corresponding to the projection operator  $P_i$ ). In concert with the usual requirements I shall demand that the collection  $\{P_i\}$  of all the measurements be mutually exclusive  $(Tr(P_i, P_j) = 0)$ , and exhaustive  $(\Sigma_i P_i = 1)$ . To avoid problems associated with quantum measurements we shall also demand that the measured observables should commute with the density matrix of the measured system  $[P_i, \rho_S] = 0$ . Thus, we shall allow for the best case<sup>9</sup> (from the demon's point of view), with no additional thermodynamic inefficiencies associated with the reduction of the state vector introduced into quantum measurement through decoherence.<sup>28-31,10,11</sup>

A measurement performed by the demon, when viewed from the outside, results in the correlation between the state of the system (i.e. location of the particle in the Gabor's engine) and the state of the demon's memory. The total entropy can be prevented from increasing, as the only requirement for a successful measurement is to convert initial density matrix of the combined system-demon:

$$\rho_{SD}^{(o)} = \rho_S \times \rho_D^{(o)} = (\Sigma_i p_i P_i) \times \rho_D^{(o)}$$

$$\tag{13a}$$

into the correlated $^{9,10,28-31}$ :

$$\rho_{SD} = \Sigma_i p_i (P_i \times \rho_D^{(i)}) \tag{13b}$$

Above, we have implicitly assumed that the measurement is exhaustive in the sense that the further refinements will reveal uniform probability distribution within the partitions

defined by  $P_i$ . This need not be the case — it is straightforward to generalize the above formulae to the case when the different memory states of the demon are correlated with density matrices of the system. In any case, the entropies of  $\rho_D^{(i)}$  and  $\rho_D^{(o)}$  can, in principle, be the same: For, there exists a unitary *controlled-not* - like evolution operator:

$$U = \Sigma_i P_i \times (|\delta_i| > < \delta_o| + |\delta_o| > < \delta_i|) \tag{14}$$

with  $|\delta_i>$  and  $|\delta_o>$  defined by  $\rho_D^{(i)}=|\delta_i><\delta_o|\rho_D^{(o)}$ , providing that  $\rho_D^{(i)}$  correspond to distinguishable (orthogonal) memory states of the demon — a natural requirement for a successful measurement.

The statistical entropy of the system-demon combination is obviously the same before and after measurement, as, by construction of U,  $H(\rho_D^{(i)}) = H(\rho_D^{(o)})$ . Moreover, the measurement is obviously reversible: Applying the unitary evolution operator, Eq. (14), twice, will restore the pre-measurement situation.

From the viewpoint of the outside observer, the measurement leads to a correlation between the system and the memory of the demon: The ensemble averaged increase of the ignorance about the content of demon's memory;

$$\Delta H_D = H(\rho_D) - H(\rho_D^{(o)}) = -\Sigma_i p_i \lg p_i , \qquad (15)$$

(where  $\rho_D = Tr_S \rho_{SD}$  and  $H(\rho) = -Tr \rho \lg \rho$ ) is compensated for by the increase of the mutual information defined as;

$$I_{SD} = H(\rho_D) + H(\rho_S) - H(\rho_{SD}),$$
 (16)

so that  $\Delta H_D = \Delta I_{SD}$  (see Refs. 29 and 33 for the Shannon and algorithmic versions of this discussion in somewhat different settings).

From the viewpoint of the demon the acquired data are definite: The outcome is some definite demon state  $\rho_D^{(n)}$  corresponding to the memory state n, and associated with the most concise record — increase of the algorithmic information content — given by some  $\Delta K(n) = K(\rho_S^{(n)}) - K(\rho_S^{(o)})$ .

The demon of choice would now either; (i) proceed with the expansion, extraction and erasure, providing that his estimate of the future gain:

$$\Delta W = k_B T (\Delta H - \Delta K) = k_B T \Delta \mathcal{Z} \tag{17}$$

was positive, or, alternatively; (ii) undo the measurement at no cost, providing that  $\Delta W < 0$ . An algorithm that attempts to implement this strategy for the case of Gabor's engine is illustrated in Fig. 3. To see why this strategy will not work, we first note that the demon of choice threatens the second law only if its operation is cyclic — that is, it must be possible to implement the algorithm without it coming to an inevitable halt.

There is no need to comment on the left-hand side part of the cycle: it starts with the insertion of the partition. Detection of a particle in the left-hand side compartment is followed by the expansion of the partition (converted into a piston) and results in extraction of  $\Delta W_p^+$ , Eq. (7), of work. Since the partition was extracted, the results of the measurement must be erased (to prepare for the next measurement) which costs  $k_BT$  of useful work, so that the gain per useful cycle is given by Eq. (9). The partition can be now reinserted and the whole cycle can start again.

There is, however, no decision procedure which can implement the goal of the right-hand side of the tree. The measurement can be of course undone. The demon — after undoing the correlation — no longer knows the location of the molecule inside the engine. Unfortunately for the demon, this does not imply that the state of the engine has also been undone. Moreover, the demon with empty memory will immediately proceed to do what demons with empty memory always do: It will measure. This action is an "unconditional reflex" of a demon with an empty memory. It is inevitable, as the actions of the demon must be completely determined by its internal state, including the state of its memory. (This is the same rule as for Turing machines.) But the particle in the Gabor's engine is still stuck on the unprofitable side of the partition. Therefore, when the measurement is repeated, it will yield the same disappointing result as before, and the demon will be locked forever into the measure - unmeasure "two-step" within the same unprofitable branch of the cycle by its algorithm, which compels it to repeat two controlled-not like actions, Eq. (14), which jointly amount to an identity.

This vicious cycle could be interrupted only if the decision process called for extraction and reinsertion of the partition before undoing the measurement (and thus causing the inevitable immediate re-measurement) in the unprofitable right branch of the decision tree. Extraction of the partition before the measurement is undone increases the entropy of the gas by  $k_B[\lg(L-\ell)/L]$  and destroys the correlation with the demon's memory, thus decreasing the mutual information: The molecule now occupies the whole volume of the engine. Moreover it occurs with no gain of useful work. Consequently, reversibly undoing the measurement after the partition is extracted is no longer possible: The location on the decision tree (extracted partition, "full" memory) implicitly demonstrates that the measurement has been carried out and that it has revealed that the molecule was in the unprofitable compartment — it can occurr only in the right hand branch of the tree.

The opening of the partition has resulted in a free expansion of the gas, which squandered away the correlation between the state of the gas and the state of the memory of the demon. Absence of the correlation eliminates the possibility of undoing the measurement. Thus, now erasure is the only remaining option. It would have to be carried out before the next measurement, and the price of  $k_B T$  per bit would have to be paid.<sup>6,7</sup>

One additional strategy should be explored before we conclude this discussion: The

demon of choice can be assumed to have a large memory tape, so that it can put off erasures and temporarily store the results of its  $\mathcal{N}$  measurements. The tape would then contain  $\sim \mathcal{N} \cdot (\ell - L)/L$  0's (which we shall take to signify an unprofitable outcome) and  $\sim \mathcal{N}\ell/L$  1's. In the limit of large  $\mathcal{N}$  ( $\mathcal{N}\ell/L >> 1$ ) the algorithmic information content of such a "sparse" binary sequence s is given by  $s^{14-20}$ :

$$K(s) \simeq -\mathcal{N}\left[\frac{\ell}{L}\lg\frac{\ell}{L} + \frac{L-\ell}{L}\lg\frac{L-\ell}{L}\right]$$
 (18)

Moreover, a binary string can be, at least in principle, compressed to its minimal record  $(s^* \text{ such that } K(s) = |s^*|)$  by a reversible computation. <sup>12</sup> Hence, it is possible to erase the record of the measurements carried out by the demon at a cost of no less than

$$\langle \Delta W^- \rangle = k_B T[K(s)/\mathcal{N}] \ .$$
 (19)

Thus, if the erasure is delayed so that the demon can attempt to minimize its cost before carrying it out, it can at best break even: The  $-k_BT$  in Eq. (12) is substituted by the  $<\Delta W^->$ , Eq. (19), which yields:

$$<\Delta W> = <\Delta W^{+}> + <\Delta W^{-}> = 0.$$
 (20)

It is straightforward to generalize this lesson derived on the example of Gabor's engine to other situations. The essential ingredient is the "noncommutativity" of the two operations: "undo the measurement" can be reversibly carried out only before "extract the partition." The actions of the demon are, by the assumption of Church–Turing thesis, completely determined by its internal state, especially its memory content. Demons are forced to make useless re-measurements. Famous Santayana's saying those who forget their history are doomed to relive it applies to demons with a vengance! For, when the demon forgets the measurement outcome, it will repeat the measurement and remain stuck forever in the unprofitable cycle. One could consider more complicated algorithms, with additional bits and instructions on when to measure, and so on. The point is, however, that all such strategies must ultimately contain explicit or implicit information about the branch on which the demon has found itself as a result of the measurement. Erasure of this information carries a price which is on the average no less than the "illicit" gains which would violate the second law.

The aim of this paper was to exorcise the demon of choice — a selective version of Maxwell's demon which attempted to capitalize on large thermal fluctuations by reversibly undoing all of the measurements which did not reveal the system to be sufficiently far from equilibrium. I have demonstrated that a deterministic version of such a demon fails, as no decision procedure is capable of both (i) reversibly undoing the measurement, and, also, of

(ii) opening the partitions inserted prior to the measurement to allow for energy extraction following readoff of the outcome.

Our discussion was phrased — save for an occassional reference to density matrices, Hilbert spaces, etc. — in a noncommital language, and it is indeed equally applicable in the classical and quantum contexts. As was pointed out already some time ago<sup>9,10</sup>, the only difference arises in the course of measurements. Quantum measurements are typically accompanied by a "reduction of the state vector". It ocurrs whenever observer measures observables that are not co-diagonal with the density matrix of the system. It is a (near) instantaneous process<sup>34</sup>, which is nowadays understood as a consequence of decoherence and einselection $^{28-34}$ . The implications of this difference are minor from the viewpoint of the threat to the second law posed by the demons (although decoherence is paramount for the discussion of the interpretation of quantum theory). It was noted already some time ago that decoherence (or, more generally, the increase of entropy associated with the reduction of the state vector) is not necessary to save the second law<sup>9</sup>. Soon after the algorithmic information content entered the discussion of demons<sup>12,21</sup> it was also realised that the additional cost decoherence represents can be conveniently quantified using the "deficit" in what this author knew then as the 'Gronewald–Lindblad inequality '35,36, and what is now more often (and equally justifiably) called the 'Holevo quantity;<sup>37</sup>

$$\chi = H(\rho) - \sum_{i} p_i H(\rho_S^{(i)}) , \qquad (21)$$

which is a measure of the entropy increase due to the "reduction". The two proofs $^{36,37}$  involving essentially the same quantity have appeared almost simultaneously, independently, and were motivated by — at least superficially — quite different considerations.

We shall not repeat these discussions here in detail. There are however several independently sufficient reasons not to worry about decoherence in the demonic context which deserve a brief review. To begin with, decoherence cannot help the demon as it only adds to the "cost of doing business". And the second law is apparently safe even without decoherence. Moreover, especially in the context of Szilard's or Gabor's engines, decoherence is unlikely to hurt the demon either, since the obvious projection operators to use in Eq. (14) correspond to the particle being on the left (right) of the partition, and are likely to diagonalise the density matrix of the system in contact with a typical environment (heat bath). (Superpositions of states corresponding to such obvious measurement outcomes are very Schrödinger cat – like, and, therefore, unstable on the decoherence timescale "4".) Last not least, even if demon for some odd reason started by measuring some observable which does not commute with the density matrix of the system decohering in contact with the heat bath environment, it should be able to figure out what's wrong and learn after a while what to measure to minimise the cost of erasure (demons are supposed to be intelligent, after all!).

So decoherence is of secondary importance in assuring validity of the second law in the setting involving engines and demons: Entropy cannot decrease already without it! But decoherence can (and often will) add to the measurement costs, and the cost of decoherence is paid "up front", during the measurement (and not really during the erasure, although there may be an ambiguity there — see a quantum calculation of erasure – like process of the consequences of decoherence in Ref. 38). Moreover, in the context of dynamics decoherence is the ultimate cause of entropy production, and, thus, the cause of the algorithmic arrow of time<sup>33</sup>. Moreover, there are intriguing quantum implication of the interplay of decoherence and (algorithmic) information that follow: Discussions of the interpretational issues of quantum theory are often conducted in a way which implicitly separates the information observers have about the state of the systems in the "rest of the Universe" from their own physical state — their identity. Yet, as the above analysis of the observer-like demonstrates, there can be no information without representation. The observer's state (or, for that matter, the state of its memory) determines its actions and should be regarded as an ultimate description of its identity. So, to end with one more "deep truth" existence (of the observers state, and, especially, of the state of its memory) precedes the essence (observer's information, and, hence their future actions).

I have benefited from discussion on this subject with many, including Andreas Albrecht, Charles Bennett, Carlton Caves, Murray Gell-Mann, Chris Jarzynski, Demon Laflamme (who contributed to lowering entropy of the manuscript), Rolf Landauer, Seth Lloyd, Michael Nielsen, Bill Unruh, and John Wheeler, who, in addition to stimulating the initial interest in matters concerning physics and information, insisted on my monthly dialogues with Feynman. This has led to one more "adventure with a curious character": In the Spring of 1984 I participated in the "Quantum Noise" program at the Institute for Theoretical Physics, UC Santa Barbara. It was to end with a one-week conference on various relevant quantum topics. One of the organisers (I think it was Tony Leggett), aware of my monthly escapades to Caltech, and of Feynman's (and mine) interests in quantum computation asked me whether I could ask him to speak. I did, and Feynman immediately agreed.

The lectures were held in a large conference room at the campus of the University of California at Santa Barbara. For the "regular speakers" and for most of the talks (such as my discussion of the decoherence timescale which was eventually published as Ref. 34) the room was filled to perhaps a third of the capacity. However, when I walked in in the middle of the afternoon coffee break, well in advance of Feynman's talk, the room was already nearly full, and the air was thick with anticipation. A moment after I sat down in one of the few empty seats, I saw Feynman come in, and quietly take a seat somewhere in the midst of the audience. More people came in, including the organisers and the session chairman. The scheduled time of his talk came... and went. It was five minutes after. Ten

minutes. Quarter of an hour. The chairman was nervous. I did not understand what was going on — I clearly saw Feynman's long grey hair and an occasional flash of an impish smile a few rows ahead.

Then it struck me: He was just being "a curious character", curious about what will happen... He did what he had promised — showed up for his talk on (or even before) time, and now he was going to see how the events unfold.

In the end I did the responsible thing: After a few more minutes I pointed out the speaker to the session chairman (who was greatly relieved, and who immediately and reverently led him to the speaker's podium). The talk (with the content, more or less, of Ref. 39) started only moderately behind the schedule. And I was immediately sorry that I did not play along a while longer — I felt as if I had given away a high-school prank before it was fully consummated!

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